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substantial literature on lower federal courts and state courts suggests that the "haves"
usually come out ahead in litigation because they possess superior resources for it and they
reap advantages from their repeat player status. We investigate the success of 10 categories
of litigants before the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts to determine whether the resources or
experience of litigants has effects on Supreme Court outcomes paralleling those found in the courts
below. While different categories of litigants are found to have very different rates of success, those
differences do not consistently favor litigants with greater resources. A time series analysis of the
success of different categories of litigants over the 36 years studied suggests that the changing
ideological complexion of the Court has a greater impact on the success of litigants than differences
among litigants in resources and experience.
A

e examine the impact of litigant status and
the changing ideology of the U.S. Supreme
Court on differences in the success rates of
direct parties before the Court. Simply, we seek to
explain why some categories of litigants win more
frequently than others when appearing before the
Court. Previous explanations have attributed differential success rates in lower federal courts to, inter
alia, disparities between litigants of different status in
judicial experience and resources. We argue, however, that differential success rates in Supreme Court
decisions have more to do with the ideological composition of the Court and the Court's receptivity to
the different types of legal claims made by litigants of
different status.
Previous research indicates that the status of litigants before American courts has substantial influence on judicial outcomes. Higher-status parties enjoy significant advantages in appellate courts and
usually win. This has been demonstrated in the U.S.
courts of appeals (Sheehan and Songer 1989) and, to
a lesser degree, in state supreme courts (Wheeler et
al. 1987). Curiously, the impact of litigant status on
U.S. Supreme Court decisions has not been widely
studied.
Among other arguments frequently advanced to
explain status differentials in litigant success rates are
that higher-status litigants typically possess superior
resources or greater litigation experience (or both).
Galanter (1974), for example, cites the advantage that
corporations and especially governments enjoy as
"repeat players" in comparison to less-experienced
single-shot litigants. Repeat players are presumably
better able to "play for the rules" in the legal process.
They can settle cases likely to be lost in the courts and
appeal cases they have the best chance of winningand thus maximize their success rates.
In contrast, Sheehan and Songer (1989) stress the
importance of resource differentials. They observe
that even among single-shot litigants, the poor lose
W
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more frequently than wealthier individuals. Litigation, of course, is expensive. Litigants with superior
resources can arguably retain better legal counsel,
undertake more extensive research, and otherwise
invest more in case preparation.
Another possibility, largely neglected in the literature, is that status differences in success rates reflect
not only the relative resources and experience of
litigants but also the values, ideological preferences,
and prejudices of the Court. Numerous studies
(Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Cover 1989; Tate
1981) document the effects that the political values of
judges have on judicial decisions. Although no one to
our knowledge has linked these values to litigant
status, the connection is easily made in theory. Litigant status is related to the types of cases brought
before' the Court and to the positions taken by the
parties. Cases brought by minorities, the poor, and
individuals against businesses or government frequently emphasize claims of individual rights and
liberties. Thus, they are likely to appeal to liberal
values and to enjoy greater success in courts with
liberal majorities. Conversely, cases brought by businesses against governments more typically seek regulatory relief, appealing to conservative values.
Our contention is that ideology is likely to be
especially salient in cases before the U.S. Supreme
Court. One reason is that litigant resource and experience differentials are likely to diminish both in size
and importance at higher levels of the judicial system. Litigants whose cases have survived the gauntlet of the appeals process have proven they possess
both considerable stamina and substantial resources.
They also have acquired significant experience in the
process. Assuming that status differences bear as
much on decisions to grant certiorari as on decisions
on merit, cases between litigants with the largest
resource and experience differentials are unlikely to
make it onto the Court's docket in the first place.
Moreover, a case raising questions important enough
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Net Advantage of Parties, 1953-88 (%)

TYPE OF
PARTYa

OVERALL
SUCCESS RATE
(1)

SUCCESS
RATE AS
RESPONDENT
(2)

APPELLANT'S
OPPONENTS
SUCCESS RATE
(3)

Poor individual
Minorities
Individual
Unions
Small business
Business
Corporations
Local govt
State govt
Federal govt

31.2
55.6
42.9
53.9
42.7
44.3
38.6
45.8
54.1
67.3

38.5
44.3
35.2
39.0
29.2
36.0
29.3
43.1
51.0
59.1

70.5
34.9
52.6
36.4
46.9
47.9
48.6
49.4
39.8
23.2

NET
ADVANTAGEb

(4)
-32.0
9.4
-17.4
2.6
-17.7
-11.9
-19.3
-6.3
11.2
35.9

aln order of increasing status.

'Col. 2 - Col. 3.

likely experience as repeat players in litigation. Although using status as a proxy for resources and
experience precludes an assessment of the independent effects of resources versus experience, it does
permit assessment of their combined effects vis-a-vis
ideology.
To measure the changing ideological predisposition of the Supreme Court across the 36 years encompassed by this study, we use the ideology scores
developed by Segal and Cover (1989) for individual
justices.2 To create a composite measure of the ideology of the Court we sum Segal and Cover's individual ideology scores across the nine justices who
comprise the Court in any year.

to be granted certiorari is likely to have sufficient
cachet to attract quality counsel willing to argue the
case for the visibility and prestige the case might
bring. Parties to such cases can also frequently supplement their resources with contributions from concerned individuals and (especially) interest groups.
A second reason for hypothesizing that ideology
will have a greater impact on the success of direct
parties before the Supreme Court is our belief that
ideological considerations are likely to be more
sharply defined in cases reaching the Supreme Court.
Again, because the Court controls its docket, it can
select cases where peripheral issues are minimized
and issues of principle predominate. Although there
are exceptions, lower-level courts generally have less
docket control and confront more cases where philosophical issues are obscured by other considerations.

RESULTS
Table 1 reports the success rates of the 10 categories
of litigants in cases decided by the Supreme Court
during the years 1953-88. As expected, success rates
vary widely across the several categories of litigants,
ranging from 67% for the federal government to only
31% for poor individuals. However, the overall success rates of litigants can be misleading. Because the
Supreme Court is well known for its tendency to
reverse decisions from below,3 litigants whose cases
are accepted on appeal are more likely to win than
those who appear as respondents. To compensate for
this, Table 1 also reports the net advantage of each
class of litigant. This measure controls for appellant
status by focusing upon the success rate of litigants in
cases in which they are respondents and subtracting
the success rate of their opponents in cases in which
the opponents are respondents.4
If the resources and experience hypotheses are
correct, we would expect the net advantage of the 10
litigant groups to vary directly with their status
rankings. In fact, the relationship is quite weak. The
federal and state governments enjoy significant advantages over other litigants, but so do minorities.

DATA AND MEASURES
Data on the differential success rates of direct parties
before the Supreme Court are available from the U.S.
Supreme Court data base. The data base includes all
cases decided with opinion by the Supreme Court
between 1953 and 1988. Parties to these cases are
identified by the labels given them in the Court's
judgment or opinion. The detailed listing of parties in
the data have been reduced to 10 categories: poor
individuals, minority group individuals, other individuals, unions, small businesses, corporations,
other businesses, local governments, state governments and the federal government.1
Since the Supreme Court data base is constructed
from the written opinions of the Court, it does not
provide direct measures of the financial resources or
previous litigation experiences of litigants. To circumvent this problem we have adopted a strategy suggested by Wheeler and his colleagues (1987), ranking
the 10 categories of litigants from strongest to weakest based on estimates of their financial resources and
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Individuals, especially the poor, are severely disadvantaged before the Court; but so are corporations
and small businesses.
The overall net advantage of a category of litigants
can be misleading, because the nature of the cases in
which they typically are involved may bring them
into conflict disproportionately with stronger or
weaker opponents. To control for this possibility, we
calculated the net advantage of each category of
litigants against each of the other nine categories of
litigants in our analysis. The results reinforce our
observations both of the extreme variation in success
rates among parties and of the limited impact of
status differences (resources and experience) on success.
Predictably, during the 36 years spanned by our
analysis, the federal government enjoyed very large
net advantages against all other parties. But the
federal government is the only party that consistently
dominated lower-status parties. In Table 2, the party
assumed to have superior resources and experience
had a net advantage in 20 of the 29 comparisons
(69%) for which sufficient cases are available. However, in 5 of those 20 cases, the advantage of the
stronger party was negligible (i.e., five percentage
points or less). Thus, the party presumed to be
stronger enjoyed a clear-cut advantage in only 15 of
29 comparisons-just about what would be expected
by chance if we knew nothing about the relative
status of competing parties.
A different perspective on the resources argument
is provided by examining the success rates of litigants
over time. If resources and experience are determining factors in Supreme Court decisions, we would
expect success rates to be relatively stable over time,
since the relative resources and judicial experience of
parties probably have not changed much over the
years. In contrast, the ideological composition of the
Court has changed dramatically. Thus, if ideology is
a determining factor we would expect the success
rates of different status litigants to vary significantly.
Table 3 displays the success rates for various combinations of litigants5 across three periods corresponding roughly with the Warren Court (1953-70),
the early Burger Court (1971-80) and the later Burger
and Rehnquist Courts (1981-88).6 Consistent with the
ideology hypothesis and contrary to the resource
hypothesis, the relative success rates of parties before
the Supreme Court vary considerably. Predictably,
individual litigants have suffered most from the
growing conservatism of the Court, their success
rates falling in relation to all other categories of
litigants.7 The pattern among other pairs of litigants
is more complex. Businesses have fared better against
the federal government but worse against state and
local governments. State governments fared better
against the federal government during the early
Burger years but much worse during the Rehnquist
years. Although the reason for this is not immediately apparent, an explanation is offered in a subsequent section.
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Net Advantage for Different Combinations of
Parties, 1953-1988
COMBINATIONS OF
PARTIES
Poor individuals vs.
Federal government
State government

NET ADVANTAGE
BY %
Federal government, 52.4
Poor individuals, 1.8

Minorities vs.
Federal government
State government
Local government
Businesses
(incl.
corp. & sm.)

Minorities, 15.7

Individuals vs.
Federal government
State government
Local government
Businesses
Corporations
Unions

Federal government, 33.0
State government, 17.6
Local government, 5.4
2.1
Businesses,
Individuals, 17.1
Unions, 10.6

Unions vs.
Federal government
Businesses
Corporations

Federal government,
Unions, 30.7
Corporations, 16.7

vs.
Small businesses
Federal government
State government
Businesses
Corporations

Federal government, 21.3
State government, 23.1
Businesses,
50.0
Corporations, 5.7

Businesses vs.
Federal government
State government
Local government
Corporations

Federal government, 43.8
State government, .9
Local government, 5.7
20.4
Businesses,

Corporations vs.
Federal government
State government
Local government

Federal government, 50.1
State government, 28.6
Corporations, 32.1

Local government vs.
Federal government
State government

Federal government, 16.2
Local government, 15.0

State government vs.
Federal government

Federal government,

Federal government,
Minorities, 12.2
Minorities, 24.7

24.6

22.9

30.3

MULTIVARIATE MODELS
So far, examination of the resource and ideology
hypotheses has been limited to comparisons of success rates across different combinations of litigants
over time. Although illuminating broad patterns,
these comparisons do not provide systematic estimates of the relative effects of either status or ideology. To obtain such estimates, we report logistic
regressions in Table 4 for all Supreme Court decisions
between 1953 and 1988 that involve some combination of our four aggregate litigant groups (i.e., individuals, businesses, state and local governments, and
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of litigants. The evidence regarding the former is
weak at best. In the business model and state and
local government model, resource differentials appear to contribute significantly to the outcome of the
case, although the size of the effect is quite modest.
Resources, however, are not significant predictors of
decisions in cases involving individuals or the federal
government.
Further weakening the resource argument is the
evidence that the effects of resources in the business
model and state and local model stem almost entirely
from the tendency of these parties to lose consistently
to the federal government. In analyses in which cases
involving the federal government are removed (not
shown), resources cease to be statistically significant
in the business model and are reduced to borderline
significance in the state and local government model.
In contrast to resources and experience, the ideology of the Court has had considerable impact on the
success rates of litigants of different status. This is
most clearly seen for individual litigants who have
enjoyed much greater success before the Court during more liberal periods regardless of the resources of
opposing litigants or of their status as appellant or
respondent.
Predictably, the ideology of the Court also has
strong and significant effects on the success of state
and local governments. Given that conservatism traditionally accords priority to the claims of order and
community over the rights of individuals, it is not
surprising that the success of state and local governments before the Court has been related inversely to
the liberalism of the Court.
As we have seen, the federal government wins the
great majority of its cases against all comers regardless of the relative resources of opposing parties or of
the ideology of the Court. Nevertheless, the advantage enjoyed by the federal government in all situations increases significantly as conservatives gain in
strength on the Court, although it increases at only
about half the rate that the advantage enjoyed by
state and local governments does.

Success of Party Combinations over Time,
1953-88 (%)
TYPE OF
PARTY
Individual

1953-70

1971-80

1981-88

75.3 (174)
65.6 (518)
52.5 (503)

48.6 (138)
40.5 (870)
28.0 (414)

42.6 (129)
32.8 (585)
16.6 (259)

58.7 (179)
25.2 (361)

42.6 (209)
27.6 (243)

47.5 (139)
31.5 (111)

37.1 (35)

46.8 (47)

22.6 (31)

vs.

Businessb
State and local
Federal
Business vs.
State and local
Federal
State and local
vs. federal

Note: Percentages are of cases won by first party listed. Number of cases
in which the two parties opposed each other are in parentheses.
aPoor individuals, minorities, and other individuals.
"Small businesses, corporations and other businesses.

the federal government). Logistic regression is used
since the dependent variable for each case is coded 1
if the litigant group won and 0 if it lost. Predictor
variables in the four models include the status differential of the litigants (which serves as a proxy for
differential resources and litigant experience)8 and
the aggregate ideological composition of the Court
described previously. As a control variable, we also
coded whether the litigant group in question was the
appellant or respondent in the case.
Confirming the well-established tendency of the
Supreme Court to reverse decisions from below, the
models in Table 4 clearly indicate that all four classes
of litigants have greater probabilities of success when
they are appellants. The relationship is statistically
significant and strong in all of the models and holds
irrespective of the ideological composition of the
Court or the relative resources of the litigants.
More important from our perspective, however, is
the evidence of the relative effects of litigant resources and the ideology of the Court on the success

Logit Estimates for Models of Party Success
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

INDIVIDUAL

BUSINESS

FEDERAL

Appellant

.724*
(.079)

.903*
(.104)

.222*
(.087)

.897*
(.102)

Ideology

.155*
(.013)
-.094
(.062)

-.018
(.032)
.231 *
(.043)

- .140*
(.014)
.257*
(.058)

-.079*
(.016)
-.072
(.083)

-.843
28

-.718

-.228
17

.653
2

Resources
Intercept
Errorreduction (%)

1

Note: Success = 1. Numbers in parentheses equal standard error.
p '

STATE AND
LOCAL

.01.
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Time Series Models of the Effects of Ideology on Direct Party Success
INDIVIDUAL VS.
BUSINESS
STATE
FEDERAL
Ideology
Noise modela

RMSb
ARMSC
Qd

2.9
(1.31)
MA(3) -.39
(.156)

3.7
(.973)
MA(3) -.29
(.145)

289
14.1
14.0

3.1
(.837)
MA(1) -.34
(.094)
MA(5) - .76
(.091)

193
18.5
7.1

80
35.4
6.8

BUSINESS VS.
STATE FEDERAL
1.1
(.611)

289
18.8
5.4

-1.3
(.393)
MA(3) .39
(.162)

100
25.9
5.8

STATE VS.
FEDERAL
2.8
(2.00)

1,239
2.3
12.0

Note: Models estimated with BMDP2T. Standard errors for parameter estimates in parentheses. Estimates more than twice as large as their standard errors
are significant at the .05 level.
'Moving Average specification for noise; the order of the Moving Average process is in parentheses.
bRMS is the mean of the residual sum of squares for the model; it measures the model's "goodness-of-fit." Lower values indicate a better fit.
cPercentage improvement (i.e. reduction) of the full model compared to the noise model only.
dThe Ljung-Box Q tests of autocorrelation in the model's residuals; with 12 degrees of freedom, none of the Q estimates are statistically significant at the
.05 level.

A TIME SERIES PERSPECTIVE
The evidence so far suggests that the ideological
composition of the Supreme Court has a much
greater impact on the success- of litigants than the
resources the litigants possess. To better assess the
aggregate effects of the changing ideological character
of the Court on litigant success over the past threeand-a-half decades embraced by this analysis, we
estimated a series of transfer function models using
yearly success rates for each of the six pairs of
litigants as dependent variables and the yearly index
of the ideological composition of the Court as the
independent variable. The transfer function models
were estimated using standard Box-Jenkins methods
(Box and Jenkins 1976). These enable us to measure
the effects that ideology has had on the changing
fortunes of the different categories of litigant over the
36-year period, while controlling for the well-known
problems associated with time series (Granger and
Newbold 1986).9
The transfer function models are reported in Table
5.10 Since the ideology of each justice is measured on
a scale of 1 (most liberal)to -1 (most conservative), the
impact coefficients represent, in effect, the average
increase in the success rate of one party over another
resulting from the replacement of a relatively moderate member of the Court by a liberal member or a
conservative member by a moderate one. For example, the coefficient for the impact of ideology on the
success rate of individuals involved in litigation
against state governments indicates that each unitincrease in the conservatism of the Court has reduced
the success rate of individuals against states by
slightly less that four percentage points. Although
this impact may appear small, its effect over time can
be substantial. Thus, from the high-water mark of
liberalism on the Court in 1969 (ideology = 6.50) to the
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high tide of conservatism in 1988 (ideology = -2.02),
the changing ideological composition of the Court
was associated with a cumulative reduction in the
success rate of individuals of almost 32 percentage
points.
The pattern of effects in these models is very
similar to that reported in the individual analyses.
New is the evidence of the cumulative magnitude of
the effect of the changing ideology of the Court. The
impact of ideology on the success rates of individuals
is especially dramatic. The increasing conservatism in
the Court since the Warren years has been associated
with a reduction in the success rates of individuals
against business by 25 percentage points, against
states by 32 percentage points, and against the federal government by 26 percentage points. As suggested in the analysis of individual cases, the conservative tide has hurt businesses relative to state and
local governments. However, the cumulative loss,
although statistically significant, has been less than
10 percentage points and has been compensated by
an 11% increase in business successes against the
federal government.
The one model in which ideology is not statistically
significant involves cases where the federal government opposes local or state governments. Contrary to
our expectation that the increasing conservatism on
the Court should benefit states in their struggles
against the federal government, the direction of the
impact coefficient indicates that states have won less
frequently against the federal government as the
Court has grown more conservative. Although not
statistically significant, the size of the coefficient is
substantial. One possible explanation for this is simply that the number of cases involving the federal,
state, and local governments as opposing litigants is
relatively small. Since only slightly more than one
hundred such cases have been decided over the

Vol. 86, No. 2

American Political Science Review
36-year-period, the success rates for states are highly
in the early years, where the
volatile-especially
number of cases is especially small. Although this
would account for the lack of statistical significance, it
does not explain the large, contrary-to-theory impact
coefficient.
Another possibility is that the impact of ideology
on the success of the federal government may depend on the ideological or partisan complexion of the
federal government as much as that of the Court. The
increasing conservatism of the Supreme Court has
not occurred in a vacuum. Rather, it is closely linked
to the control of the executive branch of the federal
government by conservative Republican administrations. Similarly, the increase in the liberalism of the
Court in the 1960s was associated with the domination of that decade by liberal Democratic administrations. Although the ideological complexion of individual state and local governments also changes, the
large number of states and localities and the crosscutting nature of change mean that the aggregate
ideology of states and localities is much stabler over
time than the ideology of the federal government.
Given this pattern, it is possible that the ideological
orientation of the federal government as a litigant
before the Court is linked to the ideology or partisan
orientation of the administration and, therefore, that
the success of the federal government versus states is
a product jointly of the ideology of the Court and of
the federal government. In other words, we hypothesize that Democratic administrations will win more
frequently against state and local governments as the
liberalism of the Court increases but that Republican
administrations will win more frequently against
states and localities as the Court becomes more
conservative.
To test this possibility, we created a partisancontrolled measure of the success of state and local
governments versus the federal government and estimated a new transfer function model of the impact
of ideology. The results are encouraging. The impact
coefficient is strong, negative, and statistically significant, indicating (as predicted) that the success of
state and local governments against democratic administrations has declined as the Court has become
more liberal and that state successes against Republican administrations have declined as the Court has
become more conservative. Although the reduction
in the residual mean square produced by this model
still is quite small (about 5%), it is double the reduction achieved in the model without partisan controls.
Finally, the pattern suggested in these data help to
explain the observation in Table 3 that the success of
state and local governments against the federal government increased in the 1970s before declining in the
1980s. During the early 1970s, Republican administrations faced a still largely liberal Court where, as at
the end of the decade, a Democratic administration
faced a Court well on its way to becoming conservative. The result was an ideological and partisan
environment much more conducive to the interests of
states and localities than the 1980s with its conserva-
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tive Court and Republican administration or the
1960s with a liberal Court and Democratic administrations.

CONCLUSION
Examination of the success of direct parties before the
Supreme Court suggests that litigant resources and
experience are considerably less important than in
other appellate courts. The contrast between the
Supreme Court and the U.S. courts of appeals is
especially dramatic. Our analyses confirm the existence of marked differences in the success rates of
different categories of litigants before the Supreme
Court. However, these differences are not related
consistently to litigant status and vary substantially
over time in ways suggesting that these differences
have little to do with litigant resources or judicial
experience and much to do with the changing ideological composition of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, what little evidence there is for the
importance of resources and experience stems almost
entirely from the observed dominance of the federal
government against all other categories of litigants.
Although the federal government's consistent success before the Court may be a consequence partly of
its superior resources and experience as a repeat
player, it also may be due to a variety of other,
non-resource-related factors. Among the more important of these, we speculate, is the long-standing
substantialevidencedoctrine, which encourages judicial
deference to the federal government. In addition, our
analyses provide evidence of what Dahl (1957) contends is a long-term political dynamic that tends to
produce an ideological and partisan "alliance" between members of the Court and presidential administrations. This dynamic is most clearly evident in the
increasingly conservative tenor of presidential Court
appointments since 1980 and the Court's increasing
support for the positions of conservative, Republican
administrations during the same period.
Of course, this research can be faulted in a variety
of ways. For example, the use of litigants' status as a
proxy for their resources and judicial experience
introduces considerable measurement error into the
analysis, as does the identification of the ideological
interests of litigants based on their group identities.
As we have noted, even poor defendants with interesting cases can attract skilled and experienced counsel and the financial support of powerful interest
groups. Were more direct measures of litigant resources available, we might observe smaller resource
differences between litigants and these small differences might have greater effects on judicial outcomes.11
Similarly, the diversity of ideological points of view
within categories of litigants means that the effects of
ideology are almost certainly underestimated. For
example, the weak effect that ideology appears to
have on the success of state and local governments
versus the federal government may result because

Parties Before the Supreme Court

June 1992

state and local governments frequently press claims
(e.g., that their environmental regulations not be
overridden by more conservative federal standards)
that are more liberal than our underlying assumption
recognizes.
Clearly, direct measures of litigant resources and
ideological claims would be desirable. Unfortunately
they are unavailable. Moreover, such data could not
reasonably be obtained for a set of cases as extensive
as the Supreme Court data base without a commitment of time and money equal, perhaps, to those
already invested in that project.
Nevertheless, although limited by the availability
of data and the need to rely on proxies as measures
for key concepts, we have provided the first systematic analysis of the success rates of different categories
of litigants appearing before the Supreme Court. In
addition to demonstrating that success rates of litigants vary widely both across different types of
litigants and over time, the analysis is at least suggestive as to the causes of these differences. Theory
suggests-and our data support-the argument that
litigant success before the Supreme Court depends
substantially on the ideological composition of the
Court but little, if at all, on the resources and prior
judicial experience of the litigants.

Notes
We wish to thank Harold Spaeth for providing us with a
preliminary copy of the U.S. Supreme Court data base, phase
I.
1. The category of poor individuals includes only parties
who were clearly identified in the Court opinion as indigent.
The individual category is obviously underinclusive, since it
excludes individuals who are poor or members of groups
usually considered to be protected minorities. It also excludes
individuals who appear before the court in their professional
capacity. Corporations are defined simply as very large business entities (e.g., airlines, railroads, banks, insurance companies, and oil companies). Small businesses are those which
are more likely to have an individual owner-proprietor,
including bookstores, realtors, restaurants, and theaters. The
residual business category includes businesses in between the
other two or whose sizes are ambiguous. A number of parties
were not encompassed in any of these categories, including
professional associations such as the American Medical Association, churches, clubs, environmental groups, public interest organizations, and nonprofit groups. Since the resource
levels or ideological orientations for most of these groups
were ambiguous and the number of cases involving a number
of these groups were quite small, we have excluded them
from the analysis.
2. The construction of these scores and their underlying
assumptions and limitations are discussed in detail by Segal
and Cover (1989). Simply, Segal and Cover assign each justice
an ideological score between -1 (most conservative)and 1 (most
liberal) based on content analyses of newspaper editorial
commentaries of the justices' judicial philosophies at the time
of their appointments to the Court. The measure was constructed by, in essence, computing the percentage of paragraphs in the editorials of four newspapers that were coded
liberal, conservative, or moderate by three separate coders:
"Liberal statements include (but are not limited to) those
ascribing support for the rights of defendants in criminal
cases, women and minorities in equality cases, and the
individual against the government in privacy and first amend-
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ment cases. Conservative statements are those with the
opposite direction" (p. 559). The resulting construction reflects the perceived ideology of new justices relative to prevailing values at the time. There were a few early justices who
were not included in the Segal and Cover study. We estimated a score for these justices from the scale analyses
reported in Rhode and Spaeth 1976 and Schubert 1965. Based
on their relative scale scores, the justices were placed within
the Segal and Cover scale. Most of these justices were
involved in a small number of cases. The two who were
involved in a large number of cases were Black and Douglas,
both of whom it was very easy to classify as liberals.
3. During the period under study, the Court's reversal rate
was 67%.
4. This measure reverses the logic advanced by Wheeler
and his colleagues in measuring the effects of the opposite
tendency of state courts to affirmcases from below (1987, 418).
5. Because the number of cases for several categories of
litigants becomes very small when disaggregated over time,
we collapsed the 10 categories of litigants used in other
analyses into four categories: individuals, businesses, state
and local governments, and the federal government. Since
unions do not fit naturally into any of these categories and
were involved in relatively few cases, we dropped them from
the remainder of the analysis.
6. These periods were chosen primarily on the basis of
political factors surrounding the appointment of new justices
and the effect of these appointments on decisional trends. The
1953-70 period corresponds with the appointment of Chief
Justice Warren up to the appointment of Justice Blackmun.
After the appointment of Blackmun in the early Burger Court,
we see a significant change in the number of liberal decisions
emanating from the Court. During the period 1981-88, we see
an even greater drop in the number of liberal decisions
delivered by the Court. These three periods allow us to obtain
an indication of the effect of changes in the Court's composition and ideological direction, on the success of different types
of parties.
7. It could be argued that the individual success rates are
the result of the low success rates that criminal defendants
generally have in appellate courts. To control for this possibility, the success rates of individuals were analyzed for
criminal and noncriminal cases. Utilizing the same court
periods, the success of individuals in criminal cases were
58.1% (Court 1), 31.8% (Court 2), and 25.1% (Court 3). In civil
cases, individual success rates were 61.1%, 41.7%, and 30.1%,
respectively. Thus, we conclude that the success of individuals has consistently declined across time in both criminal and
noncriminal cases, and these data provide further evidence of
the impact of ideological change on the fate of individual
litigants.
8. The status/resourcevariable assumes a status continuum,
along which individuals = 1, business = 2, state and local
governments = 3, and federalgovernment = 4. Thus, when a case
involves the federal government versus individuals as litigants, the status/resource differential is 3 or -3, depending on
whether the model is explaining federal success or individual
success. Similarly, when an individual opposes a business,
the business would be coded as having a status/resources
advantage of 1 if the individual was coded as having a
disadvantage of -1.
9. The use of Box-Jenkins procedures also makes it possible to test for Granger causality in the relationship between
the Court's ideology and litigant success rates (Freeman 1983;
Granger 1969). Strictly speaking, Granger causality implies
that lagged values of X explain variance in current values of Y
that cannot be explained by past values of Y. In this case, it
means that past values of the Court's ideology explain current
litigant success that cannot be explained by past values of
litigant success. (E.g., the introduction of lagged values for
ideology result in a significant improvement in the residual
mean square.) In fact, the best-fitting model specifications for
all litigant groups is a model in which the effects of ideology
on success rates are untagged. In every case, a model specified with a lagged ideology effect of one year was also
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significant, albeit somewhat smaller. Although the specification of unlagged ideology effects weakens the case for
Granger causality in these relationships, the significant improvement in the residual mean square registered in all of the
models except the state-and-local-versus-federal-government
one provides at least modest evidence of Granger causality.
10. The impact coefficients in these models measure the
expected change in the success rates of an opposing pair of
litigants produced by a one-unit change in the aggregate
ideology of the Court. Several of the models have significant
moving average components in the error term. These indicate
the existence of short stochastic cycles. The statistics at the
bottom of the table provide summary measures of the models'
performance and indicate that all of the models perform
acceptably (again, except for the federal-versus-state-andlocal model). Ideology produces reductions in the residual
mean square in each model of between 15% and 35%, and the
Ljung-Box Q-statistic indicates that the residuals in all models
are appropriately free of autocorrelation.
11. It should be noted, however, that our measure of
litigant status/resources is the same used in previous studies
where resources have been shown to be significantly related
to judicial success rates (Sheehan and Songer 1989). Thus, the
suggestion that resource differentials are smaller and less
consistent among Supreme Court litigants and have smaller
effects on litigant success is less a problem of measurement
than confirmation of our initial hypothesis about the limited
impact of resources on Supreme Court outcomes.
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